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PLURALIST ESTABLISHMENT: REFLECTIONS
ON THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE
Robert E. Rodes, Jr. *
What I have to offer here is a' historical account.' Before I em-
bark on it, it might be a good idea for me to say something about why
I am doing it, and what my account has to say to people who are not
historians by vocation or avocation, and who are not followers of the
religion or citizens of the country whose story I propose to tell.
My claim here is this: The medieval European church-state syn-
thesis based public life on a religious understanding of human beings
and their affairs. The English decided, at the Reformation in the six-
teenth century, to update the old synthesis rather than scrap it and
start over as both Protestants and Catholics did on the Continent. To
carry out that decision, the English had to cope with an increasing
plurality of religious beliefs and practices; this they succeeded in do-
ing without abandoning the basic religious conception of human be-
ings and their affairs on which the original synthesis was based. Their
approach contrasts with the one taken in most other countries, in-
cluding our own, where we have coped with religious pluralism by
privatizing religion and trying to base our public life on secular views
of human beings and their affairs. As these secular views come to
seem more and more inadequate, the English alternative may turn out
to have lessons for all of us.
That is my basic outline. Before starting in on it, I believe I owe
it to this institution and this audience to say something more about
my first point, the religious conception behind the medieval synthesis.
The Jewish experience of the medieval religious synthesis was, of
course, a bitter one. As a student of that synthesis, and I would have
to say in some part a believer in it, it is hard for me to know what to
say about that experience. Perhaps the best I can say is this-and I
realize how little it is. The essential value of the medieval synthesis
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School; A.B., 1947, Brown Univer-
sity; L.L.B., 1952, Harvard University.
I This paper summarizes material from a forthcoming book, which will fully develop
some of the themes introduced. Earlier versions of the theories developed here can be found in
my Pluralist Christendom and the Christian Civil Magistrate, 8 Cap. U.L. Rev. 413 (1979),
and works cited there, and at some points in my book Law and Liberation (1986). For anyone
who would like to learn more about the historical developments described here, I recommend
W.G. Addison, Religious Equality in Modem England (1944) as a clear and readable intro-
duction. H.S.Q. Henriques, The Jews and the English Law (1908) is the best work I have
found on the Jewish experience of these developments.
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was that it gave public recognition to the transcendent significance of
human beings and their affairs. It required the rich and powerful to
recognize the poor and humble as equal inheritors of the kingdom of
Heaven. It supported the sanctity of marriage and the family and
consecrated the whole round of everyday life-work and rest, plant-
ing and harvest, birth and death. It would seem obvious that if you
are going to recognize the transcendent significance of human beings
as such you cannot limit your recognition to people who share your
faith. In theory, I suppose the medievals would have conceded the
point. I cannot account for their failure to put it into practice. For
some reason, what the transcendent significance of human beings en-
tails, in the way of sharing a civil society with people who do not
share your faith, has been a hard lesson to learn. How one nation
learned it in the course of three or four centuries is a major part of the
story I have to tell.
From the time the Jewish communities were expelled from Eng-
land in 1290 until the Protestant Reformation in the 1500s, no En-
glishman belonged to a different religious body from any other
Englishman. The so-called Lollards, forerunners of Protestantism,
probably formed into groups in one place or another, but they do not
seem to have organized themselves into a separate church as we un-
derstand separate churches today.
Meanwhile, the one church was integrated into the national life
in innumerable ways. In addition to landed endowments owned out-
right, church bodies collected one-tenth of all the agricultural pro-
duce in the country and one-tenth of all the increase of livestock every
year. They fetched it out of the fields, and sued for it in church courts
if they were not allowed to take it. Church officials travelled around
the country and imposed petty punishments on the sins of the people,
and even on their failure to attend church. All marriage and probate
business was handled in church courts-marriage because it was a
Christian sacrament, probate because of an ancient connection be-
tween wills and religious preparations for death. Once dead, everyone
except suicide victims and excommunicated persons was buried in the
churchyard with a priest in attendance and a sexton ringing the
church bells.
Aside from making the priest read different services out of a dif-
ferent book, the Reformation changed nothing in this situation. The
one church of the nation was changed around by an act of Parliament,
but it was still the same church, it still performed the same functions,
and people were still compelled to belong to it, pay for it, marry in it,
take their probate and matrimonial business to its courts, and be bur-
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ied in its precincts. A nineteenth-century Anglican controversialist,
when asked where his church was before the Reformation, responded:
"Where was your face before you washed it this morning?"
As the status of the medieval church had never been seriously
challenged, the legal compulsions by which it was supported did not
have to be very efficient. After the Reformation, as theological con-
troversy became more vigorous, the old compulsions were resisted
more often in the name of conscience, and were entirely inadequate to
cope with the resistance. In the late 1500s, Parliament began adopt-
ing more severe measures, only to meet with more determined resist-
ance. A whole series of harsh penalties on religious deviance
remained on the statute books for a century, and in some cases for
two. But the local magistrates who bore the main burden of law en-
forcement were reluctant to prosecute decent and inoffensive neigh-
bors for their religious practices. They tended to look the other way.
Because of this toleration, various groups of dissenters organized
into cohesive and self-identified bodies or alternative churches. We
may date the English Roman Catholic body from about 1570, when
the pope excommunicated the queen, and when newly trained priests
started coming over from the Continent and telling believers in the
old religion to stop going to the new Anglican services. Most of the
major Protestant denominations separated out and developed their
own organizations in the 1660s, when it became apparent that their
views would not prevail in the Church of England. Jews, expelled in
1290, were let back in by Oliver Cromwell in the 1650s. After the
monarchy was restored in 1660, the government continued to protect
them, although on paper they were subject to the same penalties as
anyone else who failed to conform to the Church of England.2
By the late 1600s, the familiar triad of Catholics, Protestants,
and Jews was in place in England outside the national church. The
national church, meanwhile, continued to occupy most of the ground,
and continued to be the only legal religion-just as the medieval
church had been. Other forms of religion were illegal, but were prose-
cuted only sporadically if at all.
A series of enactments over the next century dissipated the ille-
gality of religious deviation. Most forms of Protestantism were made
legal in 1688 by the famous Act of Toleration.3 Under this Act, if you
2 See the historical discussion appended to the reports in Lindo v. Belisario, 161 Eng. Rep.
530 (Con. London 1795), aff'd, 161 Eng. Rep. 636 (Arches 1796); Goldsmid v. Bromer, 161
Eng. Rep. 568 (Con. London 1798).
3 An Act for exempting their Majesties' Protestant Subjects, dissenting from the Church
of England, from the Penalties of Certain Laws (The Act of Toleration), 1688, 1 W. & M., ch.
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said you were a dissenter from the Church of England and took cer-
tain oaths to show you were not a Roman Catholic, you were exempt
from being prosecuted for religious deviance. If you took further
oaths to show you were a Trinitarian Protestant, you could also teach
and preach and hold meetings for religious worship. In either case
you were still subject to compulsory church attendance, but you could
go to your own church instead of the Anglican church. Compulsory
church attendance as such was not repealed until 1846, 4 but no one
enforced it after 1688 except against an occasional conspicuous Sun-
day drinker.
It was the terms of the 1688 Act of Toleration, incidentally, that
required the Methodists a century later to form a separate church.5
They were founded as a movement within the Church of England, but
they violated some of the old laws against unauthorized meetings for
religious worship. To avoid those laws, they had to bring themselves
under the 1688 act, and to do that they had to say that they were
dissenters from the Church of England. With great reluctance, that is
what they did.
Roman Catholics remained illegal for most of the eighteenth cen-
tury, although no one bothered them except when the vicissitudes of
politics brought their loyalty to the government into question. There
were many people who thought that the Roman Catholic Stuart fam-
ily had a better claim to the throne than the reigning Georges, and
Roman Catholics were naturally-but quite wrongly-suspected of
being more favorable to the Stuarts than other people were. They
were finally made legal in 1778, after the death of Prince Charles Ed-
ward Stuart.6
Unitarianism was not strictly legal until 1813. The 1688 Tolera-
tion Act excluded anyone from its benefits who preached or wrote
against the doctrine of the Trinity, and there was a Blasphemy Act of
1697 that purported to punish any Christian (but not any Jew) who
denied the Trinity.7 Most Unitarian doctrine evolved gradually in old
Presbyterian churches that had not had strict doctrinal standards for
their members. The development was not much noticed until the
4 An Act to Relieve Her Majesty's Subjects from certain Penalties and Disabilities in re-
gard to Religious Opinions, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 59.
5 j. Wesley, John Wesley's Journal 402-03 (Nov. 3, 1787) (1949).
6 An Act for relieving His Majesty's Subjects professing the Popish Religion from certain
Penalties and Disabilities imposed on them by an Act made in the eleventh and twelfth Years
of the Reign of the King William the Third, entitled, An Act for the further preventing the
Growth of Popery, 1778, 18 Geo. 3, ch. 60.
7 An Act for the more effectual suppressing of Blasphemy and Profaneness (The Blas-
phemy Act), 1697, 9 & 10 Will. 3, ch. 32.
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early 1800s, when Trinitarians and Unitarians began fighting over the
possession of church property. That was when Parliament made Uni-
tarianism legal.
Generally, trusts created to support a form of worship were en-
forceable if the religious worship was legalized. Where a form of wor-
ship was not strictly legal, but just let alone by the authorities, trusts
to maintain it were sometimes lost. A Jewish trust was turned over to
Anglicans for this reason in 1754. Jewish trusts were not made en-
forceable until 1846. Similarly, Unitarian trusts were being turned
over to Trinitarians until 1844. Since most Unitarian churches had
been founded before Unitarianism became legal, the courts decided
that the founders must have meant them to be Trinitarian. Parlia-
ment remedied this injustice in 1844.8
The statutes legalizing Roman Catholic worship expressly re-
frained from legalizing endowed masses and religious orders--ele-
ments of Roman Catholicism that the Anglican church had rejected
with special vigor at the Reformation. Trusts for these purposes re-
mained illegal until 1926, although lawyers found pretty effective
ways of getting around the illegalities.
By the first years of the nineteenth century, one phase in the de-
velopment of religious pluralism was just about complete. It had be-
come virtually impossible for anyone to get into trouble for practicing
or not practicing a religion, or for holding or not holding a religious
opinion. Also, most, though not all, religious bodies were fully pro-
tected in the enjoyment of their property, and even the ones that were
not fully protected found ways to be secure most of the time. But full
economic, political, and social equality for non-Anglicans was yet to
come. They were excluded from many public offices, they were sub-
ject to taxation for the support of a church they did not believe in, and
they had to rely on that church for the performance of many of the
most important functions of civil society. In the course of the nine-
teenth century, these grievances, by and large, were met.
Protestant dissenters, although they were allowed in Parlia-
ment-they had to be, because Presbyterian Scotland sent representa-
tives to Parliament just as England did-were excluded in England
from positions in the civil service and in municipal government. Par-
liament removed these disabilities in 1828.1 Roman Catholics, besides
8 An Act for the Regulation of Suits relating to Meeting Houses and other Property held
for religious Purposes by Persons dissenting from the United Church of England and Ireland
(The Dissenter's Trust Act), 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 45.
9 An Act for repealing so much of several acts as imposes the Necessity of Receiving the
Sacrament of the Lord's Supper as a Qualification for certain Offices and Employments, 1828,
9 Geo. 4, ch. 17, § 5.
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being subject to all the disabilities of Protestant dissenters, were ex-
cluded from Parliament as well. Parliament relieved them of all these
disabilities in 182910 -evidently in the vain hope of keeping the Irish
content with being governed by England.
Jews were the last religious group to be given full political rights.
They were excluded from Parliament and from most public offices
because all the qualifying oaths had to be taken on "the true faith of a
Christian." Parliament adopted a statute in 1858 allowing anyone
professing the Jewish religion to omit those words.'1
In 1865, a new form of oath was adopted for all purposes of qual-
ification for office. It did not refer to the faith of a Christian, but it
did end with the words "so help me God." Atheists, therefore, could
not take it. Legislation existed permitting Quakers and certain other
religious groups to take an affirmation without reference to God in-
stead of taking an oath, but that helped only those who belonged to
one of the specified groups. Not until 1888 was legislation finally
adopted permitting anyone at all to take an affirmation instead of an
oath, and therefore making everyone, whatever his religion or lack of
it, eligible for public office.12
It was an obvious grievance for non-Anglicans to have their tax
money used to support the Anglican church. In 1818, Parliament ap-
propriated a million pounds to the church as a thank offering for the
successful conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. This was followed by
another half million in 1824. That was the last grant to the church
out of the national treasury. Local taxes (the English call them
"rates") could still be levied to support local churches, but the locals
had to vote for them, and dissenters were making more and more
trouble about doing so. These rates were made voluntary in 1868.13
Tithe, the old medieval share of the crops and livestock, contin-
ued to be collected, but it was not exactly a tax, and it was not exactly
for the support of the church. It resembled a rent charge on land.
Furthermore, fully one-third of it was in lay hands, and had been
since Henry VIII took over all the monasteries and gave their prop-
erty to his friends. So tithe could be thought of as private property,
and to nineteenth century English politicians private property was sa-
cred whether or not the church was. In 1836, tithe was put into a new
form, making it resemble a rent charge even more closely than it did
10 An Act for the Relief of His Majesty's Roman Catholic Subjects, 1829, 10 Geo. 4, ch. 7.
11 An Act to provide for the Relief of Her Majesty's Subjects professing the Jewish Reli-
gion, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., ch. 49.
12 The Oaths Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 46.
13 The Compulsory Church Rate Abolition Act, 1868, 31 & 32 Vict., ch. 109.
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before. It endured in this form for another century, until it was
bought off with government bonds.
The state had taken the function of poor relief from the church
before 1600. After Henry VIII confiscated the religious houses, the
necessary funds had to be collected from lay landowners, and only the
justices of the peace had the power to make them contribute. With
that one exception, all the civil functions that were performed by the
church before the Reformation were still being performed by the
church in 1830. The church was probably performing them about as
well or as badly as the government would have done, but it seemed
anomalous to make people seek major social amenities from a church
to which they did not belong.
Accordingly, a number of changes were made during the middle
decades of the century. Under an act of 1836, it became possible to
marry before a government registrar, or before a non-Anglican clergy-
man with a registrar in attendance."' Previously, everyone but
Quakers and Jews had to marry in Anglican churches. Probate and
matrimonial litigation was taken away from the church courts in 1857
and turned over to a new secular court.I5 The secular and ecclesiasti-
cal functions of local government, which had been united from time
immemorial in a single body called the parish vestry, gradually split
apart as a modern system of local government developed.
In the case of charitable and educational institutions, a general
program of reform and development included steps in the direction of
religious equality. If you are a reader of Trollope, you will know
something of the state of old charities in the early nineteenth century.
All kinds of medieval foundations had been misappropriated over the
centuries in exquisitely ingenious ways. These charities were re-
formed in the 1850s and 1860s under various Acts of Parliament.' 6
Part of the reform was to do away with any preference for benefi-
ciaries who belonged to a particular religion unless such a preference
was expressly provided in the founding documents. Since the found-
ing documents were written when everyone was of the same religion,
there was not much preference expressly provided.
Until the 1850s, the great universities of Oxford and Cambridge
were open only to Anglicans, and, with a few exceptions, only
Anglican clergy could teach there. After 1836, non-Anglicans could
14 An Act for Marriages in England, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, ch. 85.
15 An Act to amend the law relating to Probates and Letters of Administration in England,
1857, 20 & 21 Vict., ch. 77; An Act to amend the Law relating to Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes in England, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., ch. 85.
16 See, e.g., The Endowed Schools Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 56; The Charitable Trusts
Act, 1860, 23 & 24 Vict., ch. 136; The Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, 16 & 17 Vict., ch. 137.
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take degrees in the new University of London, but they were excluded
from Oxford until 1853,17 and from Cambridge until 1856.18 Parlia-
ment abolished religious tests for students in those years, but it took
further acts in 187119 and 187720 to open the faculties to non-Angli-
cans. After those Acts, anyone in the universities except the chap-
lains could be of any religion or no religion at all.
As for secondary education, the old secondary schools-the pub-
lic schools you read about in stories-were generally founded under
church auspices. They had chapel services and religious instruction,
but an 1860 act, and a number of earlier court decisions, required the
schools to give liberal exemptions to children whose parents requested
them.2'
Beginning in 1833, the government began seriously subsidizing
primary and secondary education. When it did so, the government
found schools in place, mostly under Anglican church auspices,
teaching about half the children of school age in the country. It
started making matching grants to these schools, as well as to other
schools under dissenting or Roman Catholic auspices. In return for
the grants, the government required some supervision over secular in-
struction, and it required that children whose parents so requested be
exempt from religious services and instruction.
In 1870, the government provided for schools in any place where
there were not enough private or church schools to serve all the chil-
dren. In those schools, there could be Bible reading, but no denomi-
national instruction or services. This combination of government,
church, and private schools has continued to the present. The gov-
ernment is taking more control of the church and private schools than
it had before. The church schools can still have religious instruction
and services according to their particular doctrines and practices, but
they.must exempt children whose parents request them to. The gov-
ernment schools have moved toward an ecumenical syllabus of reli-
gious instruction-again with exemption if the parents request it. The
latest statute requires the syllabus to be "broadly Christian" except in
places where the number of non-Christian students requires a differ-
ent approach.22
In the past, the main grievance of non-Anglicans regarding bur-
17 The Oxford University Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 81, § 43.
18 The Cambridge University & Eton College Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., ch. 88, § 45.
19 The Universities Tests Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., ch. 26, § 3.
20 The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge Act, 1877, 40 & 41 Vict., ch. 48, §§ 58, 59.
21 Attorney Gen. v. Cullum, 62 Eng. Rep. 948 (Ch. 1842); The Endowed Schools Act,
1860, 23 Vict., ch. 11.
22 The Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40, §§ 84-88.
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ial of the dead involved the use of Anglican services. Anyone of any
religion could be buried in the Anglican churchyard of the parish
where he had lived or died, but he had to be buried by the Anglican
priest with an Anglican service. Nothing stopped religious denomina-
tions from having their own graveyards and many did. Then, in 1853,
when the growing population required new burial space in many
places, local governments were empowered to establish additional
cemeteries with space allocated to the Church of England, and other
space allocated to other denominations or to no denomination at all.
For many reasons, however, non-Anglicans still preferred the
Anglican churchyards or the Anglican portions of the new cemeteries.
In some cases, it was a matter of keeping families together. In others,
it was a matter of using free space in the churchyard instead of paying
for space elsewhere. In either event, the family might want to use
their own services or no services at all. An act of 1880 allowed them
to do this.2
3
With this course of legislative and administrative accommoda-
tions, England became for practical purposes a pluralist society in
which all religions were equally respected, and their adherents had
equal opportunity to participate in the national life. In many ways,
though, the legal position of the Church of England was about the
same as it had been since the Reformation, and in some ways about
the same as it had been since the Anglo-Saxons. It was still an estate
of the realm. Its laws were part of the law of the land. Its enactments
continued to appear in the statute books; and the decisions of its
courts, in the law reports. Its bishops continued to sit in the upper
house of Parliament, and virtually all citizens continued to be entitled
to its ministrations. The usual way of talking about this situation was
to say that the Church of England was "established" whereas other
churches were not.
The meaning of "establish" has undergone quite an evolution
over the years, and we need to examine it carefully. Originally, it
merely meant set up, the way you establish a business or a P.T.A.
The Anglo-Saxon kings before they were Christian established tem-
ples because they wanted to keep themselves and their subjects in
good standing with the higher powers. When they turned Christian,
they established churches for the same reason. When they established
their churches, they arranged for bishops and for approval from the
pope because that was part of the religion they had come to accept.
The medieval kings organized and expanded all the institutions that
their predecessors had established-the church neither more nor less
23 The Burial Laws Amendment Act, 1880, 43 & 44 Vict., ch. 41, § 6.
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than the courts or the militia or the towns. Then Henry VIII and
Elizabeth I reformed the church that their earlier predecessors had
established and their later predecessors had carried on.
Thus, in the early 1600s, when Roman Catholics and Protestant
dissenters began organizing themselves, it was natural to refer to "the
Church of England as by law established" to contrast the official body
with the private enterprise bodies taking shape around it. A set of
canons adopted by the Church of England in 1604 used the term in
this way. It continued to be used in this way until the eighteenth
century, when the idea of multiple churches became more commonly
accepted.
In 1736, Bishop William Warburton published a book called The
Alliance Between Church and State. His theory was that churches are
inherently independent bodies, and inherently independent of the
state. However, if among all the churches on the market there is one
that commands the allegiance of a majority of the population, it is
appropriate for the state to make an alliance with it for mutual advan-
tage. The church with which such an alliance has been struck is said
to be established; other churches are not. This view of the matter is
entirely unsupported by the historical evidence, but it was eminently
useful, and it eventually became the accepted account of what it
means for a church to be established.
The great advantage of Warburton's understanding of establish-
ment was that it provided establishment with a utilitarian basis. Since
the ministrations of the Anglican church were acceptable to most
English people, it was an appropriate pursuit of the public interest for
the government to keep them available. For this reason, the Anglican
church could be "disestablished," that is, deprived of its preferred sta-
tus, in Ireland and later in Wales, where most people preferred other
churches. It could be left in place in England, where most people
maintained some kind of tie with it.
In a way, the status of the established church in England came to
be like that of the public school in the United States. Its services were
available to anyone who wanted them, and most people who wanted
church services were content with them. At the same time, people
whose needs were not met by the public services were free to use their
own resources to set up whatever alternatives they chose. Understood
in this way, the establishment was accepted by most people. It was
venerable, it was useful, and with the reforms of the early and mid-
nineteenth century, it cost the taxpayers nothing.
Today, the establishment is probably more of a burden to church
members who take their religion seriously than it is to nominal adher-
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ents or outsiders. Aside from participation in public ceremonies, the
main consequences of establishment for the church are that its bish-
ops and other top officials are appointed by the government, its legis-
lation is subject to veto by either house of Parliament, and it cannot
control access to its ministrations. Also, in the deployment of person-
nel and resources, there is a tendency to try to cover the whole coun-
try instead of concentrating on places where there are active and
growing congregations. People who think of the church as a cohesive
body of active and committed believers are apt to dislike these mani-
festations of establishment. On the other hand, people whose primary
interest in the church is political or historical generally appreciate es-
tablishment in just about the form it has taken.
What seems to me most striking about the historical evolution
that has left England in the peculiar position of being a pluralist soci-
ety with an established church is the haphazard quality of the whole
development. The medieval ideal was one of a public religious com-
mitment institutionally and liturgically embodied in a single church.
In the three and one-half centuries since the Reformation, there has
never been an officially sanctioned departure from that ideal. Rather,
religious pluralism has been recognized through specific concessions
made at specific times to specific groups because it seemed right to
make them. A broadening of the boundaries of the national church to
include a wider range of beliefs and practices accompanied these con-
cessions. The old saying that the Anglican church never interferes
with a person's politics or his religion is not altogether fair, but it does
reflect a certain pluralism within the church as well as in the relation
between the church and the wider society.
Note that English pluralism as developed in this way sharply
contrasts with the forms of pluralism that have developed in other
societies. It is not like the pluralism of the old Ottoman Empire,
where religious differences were accompanied by profound cultural
differences. English people were always able to differ in matters of
religion without differing in much else. Nor is English pluralism like
that of Germany, and to some extent France, where compromises
came out of a standoff between rival versions of what society should
be and who should control it. From 1662 on, Anglicans-at least
nominal Anglicans-were never seriously challenged for control of
English society. Finally, English pluralism is not like American plu-
ralism. The role of English Protestant dissenters in the settlement of
many of our original states left us with a national religious consensus
without any common institutional or liturgical component. The ex-
pansion of that consensus from generic Protestantism to generic
1991]
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Christianity to Judeo-Christianity to general niceness has not altered
the basic way we think of it. The English national consensus has
tended to broaden in the same way as ours, but the national church
has always been there, incorporating new theological and liturgical
movements, broadening its comprehensiveness as the consensus
broadened, and continuing to provide an institutional and liturgical
framework acceptable to a majority of the people.
It is not hard to see how our American understanding of plural-
ism developed into a general privatization of religion. Since the na-
tional religious consensus had no institutional or liturgical
component, everything about religion that involved either institutions
or liturgy was privatized from the start--or as soon as the few states
that supported churches followed the federal example and stopped.
As time went on, and the consensus was broadened to take in more
people, the religious content tended to be squeezed out of it, and so to
be left to the privatized institutions and liturgies. By the middle of
this century, this development had progressed to the point that so
wise a judge as Wiley Rutledge could characterize "the realm of reli-
gious training and belief" as "the kingdom of the individual man and
his God"-as if there were a different God for each individual man.24
Other forms of pluralism have collapsed into privatization just as
ours has. Where the public manifestations of religion have been tied
to particular forms of culture, they have not survived world-wide cul-
tural homogenization. Where they have been tied to particular posi-
tions on political or social issues, they have not survived the
replacement of those issues with new ones. The upshot has been that
everywhere but England, religious pluralism and the privatization of
religion have gone hand in hand.
It follows that our current understanding of pluralism will be
profoundly affected by the growing refusal of a number of people to
keep their religion private. This refusal is often deplored by believers
and unbelievers alike, but I believe it is inevitable. For many of us,
our conceptions of social responsibility come from the principles of
our religion. Consequently, when we become conscious of social in-
justice, we naturally look to religious principles to tell us how to put it
right. A growing awareness of social injustices, therefore, means a
growing awareness that our religious principles have public
consequences.
Furthermore, we live in a period when the transcendent value of
human beings is challenged in an increasing variety of ways. Whether
24 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1946).
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people are considered spending units in the consumer society, human
resources in the business world, cogs in some totalitarian machine, or
blobs of tissue in the world of science, their transcendent value gets
lost and needs to be affirmed. For many people, myself included, to
affirm the transcendent value of a human being is to affirm a religious
principle. A society that gives public recognition to human transcen-
dence cannot be one in which religion is merely a private matter.
To my mind, then, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the
privatization of religion is not a permanent solution to the problem
raised by religious pluralism in Western society. It stands to reason,
therefore, that we should learn something from the one Western na-
tion that has tried to solve the problem in a different way. By main-
taining an official status for a particular religious institution and a
particular set of liturgical forms, England continues to affirm tran-
scendent values in public life and transcendent standards of social jus-
tice. Granted, the affirmation is hardly more than symbolic, and the
values and standards affirmed have little substantive content. Even
so, I think that the effect of the affirmation is far from negligible.
Perhaps the most important effect is a continuing awareness that
religious commitments and religious values are to be taken seriously.
That awareness is a dominant theme of the whole history that I have
recounted. It is a history of specific measures to meet specific griev-
ances of specific people as those grievances have come to light. Every
abstract principle of church-state relations, whether philosophical or
theological, has given way before the willingness of English people to
accommodate their neighbors' concrete religious needs. English peo-
ple, however they feel about their own religion, have tended to take
other people's religion seriously. I think much of the reason for this is
they have always experienced religion as an essential element in public
life.
None of these observations really answers the question of how
the recognition--even the symbolic recognition--of one religion can
be consistent with full participation in public life for people who hold
other religions or none at all. I am not sure I have a good answer to
that question. On the other hand, I have not yet heard a good answer
to the alternative question of how governmental pursuit of an antisep-
tic religious neutrality can be consistent with full participation in pub-
lic life for people who take any religion seriously.
Perhaps neither question can be answered in the abstract. Mak-
ing room for other people is not an abstract matter at all. It is a
matter of looking at real people just as we find them, with all their
interests and concerns intact. For many of us, this making room is a
1991]
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religious as well as moral duty. It is a recognition of the transcendent
destiny of the human person, and the profound mystery of the spiri-
tual journey on which each person is embarked. I do not think ex-
cluding religion from public life or building a wall of separation
between church and state will enhance these recognitions.
Rather, I think any state needs to be in effective dialogue with
whatever religious tradition or traditions it finds among its people. I
think that the English, through the unique historical experience I
have outlined, may have approached the kind of dialogue I have in
mind. Other states and other religious traditions will have to find
different ways. Speaking as a Roman Catholic, I find the way illumi-
nated somewhat by the Second Vatican Council's document Gaudium
et Spes, which tries to position the church in the world by pointing to
the universality of human concerns:
The joys, the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the people of
this age . ., these too are the joys, the hopes, the griefs and the
anxieties of the followers of Christ. Indeed, nothing genuinely
human fails to find an echo in their hearts.25
My own hope is that because of this basic human solidarity underly-
ing all the diversity of belief and practice in the world, there can al-
ways be public recognition of religious beliefs and values in any
pluralist society. In another place, the same Vatican document says
that the church "is at once a sign and a safeguard of the transcen-
dence of the human person."' 26 I submit that any religious body in the
Jewish or Christian tradition can be such a sign and safeguard, and
that it is better to have such signs and safeguards in a pluralist society
than to lack them.
25 Gaudium et Spes, 1.
26 d. at 76.
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